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Abstract
Bitcoin [19] is a decentralized cryptocurrency that has recently gained popularity and has
emerged as a popular medium of exchange. The total market capitalization is around 1.5 billion
US dollars as of October 2013 [28]. All the operations of Bitcoin are maintained in a distributed
public global ledger known as a block chain which consists of all the successful transactions that
have ever taken place. The security of a block chain is maintained by a chain of cryptographic
puzzles solved by participants called miners, who in return are rewarded with bitcoins. To be
successful, the miner has to put in his resources to solve the cryptographic puzzle (also known as
a proof of work). The reward structure is an incentive for miners to contribute their
computational resources and is also essential to the currency's decentralized nature.
One disadvantage of the reward structure is that the payment system is uneven. The reward is
always given to one person. Hence people form mining pools where every member of the pool
solves the same cryptographic puzzle and irrespective of the person who solved it, the reward is
shared evenly among all the members of the pool. The Bitcoin protocol assumes that the miners
are honest and they follow the Bitcoin protocol as prescribed. If group of selfish miners comes to
lead by forming pools, the currency stops being decentralized and comes under the control of the
selfish miners. Such miners can control the whole Bitcoin network [29]. Our goal is to address
this problem by creating a distinct peer-to-peer protocol that reduces the incentives for the
miners to join large mining pools. The central idea is to pay the “runners-up” who come close to
finding a proof, thereby creating a less volatile payout situation. The work done by the “runnersup” can be used by other miners to find the solution of proof of work by building upon their
work. Once they find the actual solution they have to include the solution of the other miner in
order to get rewarded. The benefit of this protocol is that not only the miners save their
computational resources but also the reward is distributed among the miners.
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I.

Introduction

The Bitcoin protocol assumes that miners who put in their computational resources to solve
cryptographic puzzles are honest [29]. If a group of greedy miners comes into power, then the
decentralized nature of the currency stops and comes under the control of these miners. The
miners then can restrict transactions and only allow transactions that benefit them.
The idea of Bitcoin reflects the proposition that is usually associated with cryptography. T.
Courtois et al. [30] call it a cryptographer’s dream: a dream about the world which functions
with participants which do not see each other, do not trust each other a lot, and yet are able to
somewhat function and achieve some sort of “secure function” or prevent fraud from being
committed. An attempt to build systems which remove the necessity of having trusted parties such
as financial institutions and other businesses, intermediaries, or providers of services. Or at the
very least, to greatly decrease the trust assumptions which are necessary.
The critical part of Bitcoin is miners. They are responsible for approving and verifying the
bitcoin transaction. Apart from miners, no other user needs to verify the transactions except those
who are associated with the transactions. All the transactions are available in the public ledger
called a block chain, which miners use to verify the correctness of transactions and to prevent
double spending attacks.
Miners are not only important for verification of transaction but also for generating new
currency. They do so by putting in their computational resources to solve a cryptographic puzzle
in return for newly created bitcoins. They might generate additional income known as a
transaction fee if included in transactions (see Section II: Technical aspects of Bitcoin).
According to the Bitcoin protocol, one miner is rewarded approximately every ten minutes [19].
Bitcoin miners have come up with a strategy to form a mining pool to decrease the variance of
their income rate [29]. These pools consist of miners who put in their computation resources to
solve the cryptographic puzzle, and when they successfully find the solution, they share the
reward based on the contribution of each miner.
The Bitcoin protocol is incentive compatible; the best strategy for the pool is to be honest, and if
there is a pool of greedy miners, these miners cannot benefit from not following the protocol [4].
If a miner joins a large pool, he or she is supposed to earn the same reward as in the small pool
because miners are rewarded based on the contribution. Therefore, there is no benefit for greedy
miners to form large pools. Hence, pools consisting of honest miners pose no threat to Bitcoin
protocol. Ittay Eyal et al. has found this assumption to be wrong [29].
If a minority pool follows a strategy called selfish mining [29], they can earn more than the total
mining power. This strategy is about hiding information in selective ways and revealing the
information if needed. It is opposite to the Bitcoin assumption where the information is broadcast
to be used by others. For example, after creating the transaction, the transaction is broadcast so
that the miner can record the transaction in a block. After successfully creating the block (i.e.
after solving the cryptographic puzzle), the miner broadcasts it to other miners. The miners refer
to this block when creating the subsequent blocks.
2

In selfish mining, these miners hide the block they have discovered and keep the block private by
forking the block chain (refer to section II for more details on block chains). The honest miners
continue to mine on the public block chain while the pool (consisting of greedy miners) hides the
blocks they have discovered by keeping them private to themselves. When the time comes to
check the length of the branch, the selfish miners reveal their discovered blocks to the other
honest miners. This impacts the honest miners, for they have wasted their computational
resources on discovering blocks that are not accepted by the network.
The number of computational resources wasted by honest miners is proportionally higher than
that of selfish miners, and the pools consisting of selfish miners get rewards that are more than
the share of mining power of the network. This lures the honest miners to join the selfish mining
pool.
Ittay Eyal et al. have shown that the revenue of the selfish pool rises linearly as pool size
increases [29]. It falls opposite to the Bitcoin protocol. Once the selfish mining pool reaches a
certain stage, honest miners join the selfish mining pool to get more rewards, which indirectly
increases their revenue. This causes the selfish mining pool to come into power (i.e. become the
majority there by becoming the only source for creating the blocks). Hence, it causes the
decentralized nature of Bitcoin to fall and become centralized by getting governed by this selfish
mining pool.
This shows that the Bitcoin system is decentralized and safe only if all the miners are honest or if
the miners do not join or form any mining pools.
To avoid this, we have come up with a protocol called SharedWealth protocol, which provides
an incentive for miners to work individually. Not only is the reward shared among other miners,
but the protocol also helps the miners save computational resources. For more details on
SharedWealth protocol, refer to Section III. We have come up with protocol as a solution to the
problem mentioned by Ittay Eyal et al. [29]
The results of our protocol show that on average, each miner earns at least 1% of the reward for
every three blocks (refer to section IV for test results).

3

In summary, the contribution of this work is this:
1. Section I introduces the problem that we are solving and briefly overviews our protocol.
2. Section II gives detailed information about the cryptocurrencies and in particular the
working of Bitcoin.
3. Section III discusses our protocol (SharedWealth Protocol) in more detail by providing
examples.
4. Section IV consists of the results of the tests we conducted.
5. Section V is the conclusion and the future work.
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II.

Background of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies

This section provides a brief introduction to earlier forms of cryptocurrencies, for some of these
protocols provided the base structure for Bitcoin. The first form of electronic money was
introduced by Chaum and dubbed as untraceable electronic money [1] [2] to address the privacy
issues of paper cash (i.e. the serial number present on paper cash makes it traceable). However,
one security concern is that people can make copies of electronic money and use them at
different places. To avoid this, one can have some online clearing system to keep track of the
cash being generated, but this solution is expensive. Creating copies of paper money is highly
infeasible. Credits cards are said to be unique, and banks can identify fraud if they are used
illegally. One way of generating electronic cash is to make it difficult for people to regenerate
unless they do so under the supervision of a trusted third party, such as a bank. The RSA digital
signature can be used for generating electronic cash, as suggested in [1]. This money can be of
the form (x, f(x) 1/3(mod n)), where factorization of n is only known to the bank and f is a
cryptographic hash function. This can be summarized as follows:
1. Alice chooses a random x and r and supplies the bank with B=r3 f(x) (mod n))
2. The bank returns the third root of B modulo n: r * f(x) 1/3 (mod n) and withdraws one
dollar from Alice's account.
3. Alice extracts c=f(x) 1/3 mod n from B.
4. If Alice wants to send Bob one dollar, Alice gives him (x, f(x) 1/3 (mod n)).
5. Bob can verify with the bank to check whether the electronic coin has been used.
The benefit of this approach is that anyone can verify whether the electronic cash has the right
structure and was signed by the bank. Electronic cash provides anonymity, which means that the
bank cannot tell the electronic cash is connected to Alice.
Throughout the 1990s, various versions and advancements of this protocol were proposed. One
such contribution suggested removing the bank at purchase time [2]. This allowed the division of
coins into smaller units [3]. This system allowed the user to divide the amount C into any
number of values. The total value of the entire divided amount equals C. The security of the
system depends upon the difficulty of factoring [3]. Various startup companies have sprouted
based on this idea, such as DigiCash [4] and Peppercoin [5]. With Peppercoin, the
micropayments received were identified using cryptographic selection, which was then used for
upgrading these micropayments to macro-payments. The idea was to allow merchants to collect
micropayments and create smaller collections of macro-payments. The value of these macropayments should equal the sum of the total value of the micropayments. The benefit is that the
cost of processing the macro-payments is less than that of the micropayments. Though the
method was supposed to be secure, it did not gain much popularity. Both DigiCash and
Peppercoin failed later.

Bitcoin uses proof of work as its core for validating transactions and generating new bitcoins.
The proof-of-work system was introduced in the 1990s as a way to prevent email spam [5],
although it was never used for that purpose [6]. In 1997, another protocol called Hashcash [11]
5

that was based on [5] was used to prevent email spam. Hashcash is based on CPU cycles.
Generating hashes is expensive because it requires spending CPU cycles, but verifying is cheap
and can be done instantly. One use of Hashcash is to detect email spam. Email spam refers to
users abusing the email system by sending millions of emails. Mostly, the users belong to
commercial industry and want to market products to people. From their perspective, sending
email requires zero effort, and the success rate of making a profit is more than 0%. But on the
other side, people who receive this email are annoyed due to advertisements that do not match
their interest; moreover, their CPU resources are wasted in processing the emails. This is a major
issue for Internet service providers because handling bulk emails can result in wasting time and
money. Hence, Hashcash is used to prevent this type of attack. The following figure illustrates
the workings of Hashcash.

Alice

Bob

Alice (Sender)

Bob (Receiver)

1. Constructs the header and adds
random number
2. Computes 160-bit SHA-1 hash of
the header
3. Verifies the first 20 bits of the hash
are zeros, else increments the
random number
4. The header looks something like
this

1. Verifies the header by computing 160-bit
SHA-1 hash on the entire header
2. Checks whether first 20 bits of the hash are
zeros
3. Verifies the date is valid
4. Verifies the email address is valid

1:20:1303030600:bob@cryptosociety.org::lcMd
bZIhxKX

Fig. 1: Process of Hashcash
Header contains:







Version: Hashcash format version, 1.
Bits: Number of zero bits in the hashed code.
Date: The time that the message was sent, in the format YYMMDD [hhmm [ss]].
Resource: IP address or email address.
Rand: String of random characters, encoded in base-64 format.
Counter: Binary counter, encoded in base-64 format.
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One important part of Bitcoin is the public ledger, which provides a way for detecting doublespending. Double-spending is a strategic way of spending money more than once. The attacker
tries to misuse the trust of a merchant by convincing him that the transaction has happened and
somehow cheats the network by making them accept some different transaction. This way, the
merchant loses the product and gains no profit whereas the attacker gets the product and saves
his or her money.
In the late 1990s, auditable ecash [12] [13] was proposed. One drawback of this approach is that
the bank can detect unreported valid money [12]. Also, if the bank’s secret key is stolen, then the
whole system gets compromised. Auditable ecash provides an anonymous, auditable system that
is signature free [13]. It means that the bank does not have any secrets, and also the transactions
are untraceable.
B-money [14], proposed in 1998, was the first design that suggested transactions should be
publicly available. It proposed two protocols:


The first protocol suggested every individual should have a database that consists of
information on the total money each user has. It suggested that anyone can create money
by publishing the solution of the unsolved computational problem. The condition is that it
should be easy enough to determine the computational effort spent on the problem. The
units created will be equal to the cost of the effort spent. W.Dai. [14] provided an
example to illustrate: if someone spends 100 hours to solve the problem and it takes three
units to purchase 100 hours of computing time, then the user who spends 100 hours shall
be credited with three units. The transfer of money in this model is such that if a user A
broadcasts a message saying that he or she wants to transfer X amount to user B and that
it is signed by user A, then everyone debits X amount from user A and credits X amount
to user B, unless the balance of user B becomes negative, in which case this transaction is
ignored.



The second protocol suggested having a subset of participants or servers keep track of the
money instead of every individual. The servers are connected using USNET-style
broadcast channels [14]. The format of the transaction remains the same as the first
protocol, but the transaction is verified by a subset of participants selected randomly. The
question that arises is how we can ensure that the servers remain honest. The solution is
that the server has to deposit some amount of money in certain accounts to be used as
fines or rewards in case of proof of misconduct [14]. The server also regularly publishes
and commits to a database consisting of money creation and ownership. The users have
to check whether the account balance exceeds the total amount of money created. Hence,
the protocols mentioned in [14] allow anonymity and some form of contracts.

The next protocol is smart contracts [15]. A contract is nothing but a set of promises that are
agreed upon. It gives a structure to a business relationship. Contracts are not only written, but
oral agreements can also be considered contracts [15]. They are the essential elements of market
economy. Computer scientists and cryptographers came up with a way of combining messages
and algorithms to create new protocols. These protocols are deployed on public networks like the
7

Internet, which bring new facets similar to contract law. Smart contracts decrease computational
transaction costs [15]. The building blocks of smart contracts are protocols. Protocol in computer
science can be defined as a sequence of messages exchanged between at least two computers
[15]. It is nothing but a set of algorithms communicating via messages.
Protocols must be unique and complete in contrast to real-world contracts. Protocols for smart
contracts come in three types: self-enforcing, where one user deals with another user; mediated,
where a third party acts as intermediator between the two users; and adjudicated, which is based
on evidence [15]. Cryptographic protocols are based on obscurity. The obscurity, or randomness,
makes the system simple and public. Randomness is always associated with a key in
cryptographic protocols, and guessing it correctly should be highly infeasible. Smart contracts
are based on cryptographic protocols. Protocols of smart contracts should have structure to
provide robustness, which protects from naive vandalism and sophisticated attacks. In
conclusion, smart contracts consist of protocols, user interfaces, and promises that are shared
through an interface to establish a relationship over a public network [15].
Digital cash [16] [17] brought a revolution in how we trade. It mimicked paper cash by ensuring
anonymity and transferability of payment. It eased the way transactions happened by providing
ways like sending a payment over email, USB, Bluetooth, etc. Digital cash represents values, and
the architecture of digital cash consists of a trusted third party, such as a government or bank.
One thing to note is that electronic cash is not digital cash because it does not provide properties
such as anonymity and offline transferability.
Digital cash works as follows
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Alice asks for digital cash from her bank.
The bank deducts the corresponding amount from her account and gives her the coins.
Alice uses digital cash to buy coffee from Bob's Coffee Shop, which accepts digital cash.
Bob verifies whether the cash has been authorized by the bank.
Bob then requests the bank to pay the cash equivalent of the digital cash.
Fig 2: Example of Digital Cash Transaction

1

4, 5
2
3

Alice
8

Bob

The desired properties of digital cash follow: it is secured, so Alice or Bob cannot reproduce
digital cash; it is anonymous, so neither Alice nor Bob have to reveal their identities to each
other, nor can the banks find out who Alice paid or who Bob was paid by; it is portable, so it can
be stored on a disk; it is two way (i.e. peer-to-peer payments should be possible) and offline
capable, so Alice and Bob can have a transaction at any time without a third party authentication;
it has wide acceptability, so it is accepted and well known in the market; it is user friendly, so it
simplifies its complexity, and Alice and Bob can use it without knowing what is going on under
the hood.
Two major concerns with digital cash are anonymity and double spending. Banks can deduce
user identity by tracing the cash that they gave to Alice to match it with the cash that came from
Bob. From tracing, they can potentially identify Alice gave the cash to Bob. Electronic money
prevents this by having the bank acknowledge the payment for every transaction.
Bitcoin was proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [1]. The first Bitcoin block was mined on
January 3, 2009 [18]. This block is known as the genesis block. The very first purchase done
using Bitcoin was in May 2010[18], where a user bought a pizza for 10,000 bitcoins. Since then,
the number of transactions using bitcoins has increased tremendously; bitcoin value has been
increasing, and at one point in late 2013 it was $1200 per bitcoin [18].
The next section provides a high-level working of Bitcoin, and later sections provide the in-depth
technical details of Bitcoin.
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Overview of Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a distributed decentralized cryptocurrency [19]. The user of Bitcoin gets an address,
which can be shared with other users to be used for forming a transaction. These transactions are
added to a public ledger called a block chain. A group of miners ensures that the block chain is
unsullied in return for bitcoins as a reward. All the transactions are recorded in blocks.
These blocks form a block chain. Each block includes a unique ID and the ID of the previous
block. A valid block consists of a proof of work (i.e. a solution to the cryptographic puzzle) and
the address of the miner. This process is called Bitcoin mining. Upon successfully creating the
block, the miner publishes it to the Bitcoin network consisting of all the other miners. According
to Bitcoin protocol, the miners add blocks to the longest chain. The average mining time interval
is 10 minutes.

Fig. 3: Block Structure
BLOCK-1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK-3

Proof of Work:
0000b12c3b12bf1
Block-ID:
12189
Previous Block-ID:
1198

Proof of Work:
0000c15d6ab12b98
Block-ID:
11982
Previous Block-ID:
12189

Proof of Work:
0000c15d6ab12b98
Block-ID:
13121
Previous Block-ID:
11982

TX-1

TX-1

TX-1

TX-2

TX-2

TX-2

TX-3

TX-3

TX-3
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A Bitcoin transaction can be thought of as an exchange of electronic coins. A user transfers these
coins to the next user by digitally signing the hash of the previous transaction along with the
public key of the next user [19]. A payee can verify the signatures to validate the ownership, and
the transactions are publicly announced. The transaction structure is illustrated in Fig. 4. [19]

Transaction

Transaction

Owner 1’s
Public Key

Owner 2’s
Public Key

Hash

Hash

Owner 0’s
Signature

Owner 1’s
Signature

Owner 1’s
Private Key

Owner 2’s
Private Key

Fig. 4: Transaction Structure
The solution to cryptographic puzzles is similar to a timestamp server, which calculates the hash
of a block of items and publishes it in a newspaper or Usenet post [20-23]. The timestamp
validates the correctness of information for that particular date as a timestamp is used to generate
the hash. Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [11]. It involves
finding a value so that when hashed with SHA-256, the result begins with a certain number of
zero bits. Hence, the difficulty of proof of work depends upon the zero bits required, but the
solution can be verified with a single hash. This ensures that the block that is generated using the
proof-of-work system cannot be modified without spending computation resources. Anyone can
tell whether the block is modified by verifying the proof of work. The blocks are chained
together to form the block chain. To modify one block, one has to recompute the proof of work
of all the previous blocks, which is infeasible. According to the protocol, the miners work on the
longest chain available, for it signifies the greatest proof of work invested [19]. The proof of
work difficulty changes based on the number of blocks generated per hour. The difficulty is
increased if they are generated too quickly [19].
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The Bitcoin network is a peer-to-peer network [19]. The transactions are broadcast to all the
nodes. It is not necessary for the transaction to reach all nodes, for as long as they reach many
nodes, they are included in the block. These nodes collect the transactions into a block, and after
collecting into the block, they work on solving the cryptographic puzzle (i.e. proof of work) of
that block. Upon successfully computing the proof of work, they broadcast it to all the other
nodes. The criteria of acceptance of the block depend upon the validity of the transactions in the
block. Once the nodes accept the block, they use the accepted block for creating the next block in
the chain, using the previous block’s hash.

Technical Aspects of Bitcoin
There is no authoritative formal specification apart from the original Bitcoin white paper [19].
The three main components of Bitcoin are transactions, the consensus protocol, and the
communication network [18] [19]. The implementation of bitcoind is considered to be the de
facto specification; other details are included in "Bitcoin Improvement Proposals" (BIPs) [19].
Transactions with Bitcoin can be thought of as series of messages exchanged over the network.
A transaction consists of inputs and an array of outputs. The entire transaction is hashed using
SHA-256, and it is used as the transactions unique ID. The output, consisting of an integer value,
represents the units of Bitcoin currency. The smallest unit of currency in Bitcoin is a satoshi,
where 108 satoshis are worth one bitcoin (represented as BTC or XBT). The output of the
transaction is the script called scriptPubKey, which provides the conditions for redeeming the
transactions. The output of a transaction is included as an input of another transaction.
The scriptPubKey is also known as "pay-to-pub-key-hash." The transaction has to be signed with
the key along with the hash. Most of the transactions in Bitcoin are pay-to-pub-key-hash. The
scripting language use is an adhoc, non-Turing complete stack language with fewer than 200
commands called opcodes [18]. The opcodes include cryptographic operations like hashing and
verification of signatures. The transaction format and the scripting languages are specified in
bitcoind [18]
To redeem previous transactions, the scriptSig script and scriptPubKey script should execute
successfully. According to the Bitcoin protocol, each transaction input should match with the
previous transaction output. This means that the sum of all values of the transaction output
should be less than or equal to the sum of all inputs. Users of Bitcoin own a private key that they
can use to redeem certain outputs. Therefore, a user can have as many bitcoins as he or she can
redeem. The address of the user is the public key hash, and the address does not contain any realworld name or identity [18].
It is very difficult to secure currency that is only based on transactions. Though signatures
provide a certain form of authority for the user over previous transactions, they do not provide a
solution to the double spending problem. The double spending problem in Bitcoin can be
illustrated by Alice trying to redeem transaction inputs twice in separate transactions sent to
Dave and to Charlie. Bitcoin provides an elegant solution to the double spending attack. The
protocol specifies that all the transactions must be published publicly in a global ledger.
12

Therefore, anyone can verify a transaction by checking the public ledger. This public ledger is a
data structure that consists of a series of blocks of transactions. Each block contains the hash of
the previous block, and hence all the blocks are chained together. This chain is known as the
block chain.
If Charlie and Dave find two different block chains, then they are susceptible to a double
spending attack. One solution is to have a central authority that controls over the block chain, but
this is against decentralized property of Bitcoin, and moreover the central authority might exert
control on what transactions the block should have. Hence, having central authority for
consensus is not feasible. Bitcoin uses Nakamoto consensus [18][19]. This protocol is one of
groundbreaking innovations and one of the important aspects of Bitcoin's success. Anyone can
collect the transactions into the block, but the challenge is to solve the computational puzzle
known as the proof of work.
The steps of selecting the new block are as follows:
1. The miner who finds the solution to the computational puzzle will announce it publicly
along with the solution to the puzzle.
2. All the other miners should validate the work of the miner.
3. If the work is invalid, the miners will reject the block and continue with their work.
4. If the work is valid, and the solution of the cryptographic puzzle is also correct, the
miners accept the block.
The longest chain is said to have the highest mining power because it consists of more blocks
and is the most difficult to produce. In some cases, two valid solutions can be found at the same
time, which results in forking of the block chain. Miners can choose any one of the chains to
work on, but later they have to adopt the one that has surpassed the other chain in length. The
user must wait for blocks to be identified, which will provide confidence that transactions are
included in the block chain [18]. Usually, if there are two branches, it is most likely that the
branches contain the same transactions. Usually, Bitcoin clients require six confirmation blocks
to accept a transaction.
The only way the currency is generated is by mining. All new currency is received by the miners
and gets circulated over the network in the form of transactions. The computational puzzle (or
cryptographic puzzle) is to find a block containing n number of transactions, the hash of the
previous block, the timestamp, the version number, and a random nonce value that when
supplied to a one-way hash function results in a value, which is less than the target value. In
other words, solving the puzzle is finding the hash of the block whose result starts with enough
zero bits. The general technique used is to add a random nonce to the hash function until finding
the desired solution. Due to the randomized nature of the puzzle, each miner finds a block based
on the computational resources he puts in. The difficulty of puzzle is adjusted in such a way that
on average new blocks are introduced every 10 minutes. The adjustment is done after every 2016
blocks, which is approximately two weeks.
The mining reward is structured. It halves every four years, and it is said by the year 2140, no
new bitcoins will be created [18]. Initially, the mining reward was 50 BTC, and it was reduced to
13

25 BTC. The miners earn the block reward, but they also earn the difference in value between
the input and output of transactions in the block. This is considered their transaction fee. Users
can include the transaction fee in their transaction for their transaction to be included in the block
more quickly.
Mining depends on the difficulty of the cryptographic puzzle. The difficulty (D) is adjusted by
network. The probability of finding the valid block is 1/ (232 D). The average number of blocks
found by the miner is ht / (232 D) where h is the hash rate and t is time [27].
For example, if Dave has an ASIC that can perform billion hashes per seconds, h=109
hash/seconds. If he mines for a day based with difficulty D = 1990906 and the block reward is 25
BTC, he will find an average of 0.010 block/day, so he will make 0.2525 BTC per day.
Usually miners form a pool to solve the computation puzzle and to lower the variance of their
revenue by dividing the reward with the others members of the pool [18]. The mining pools are
usually governed by the manager, who distributes the rewards to the members of the pool based
on the amount of work they have done for the pool. Mining pools were not part of original
protocol, but since 2013 mining is done mostly in pools [18]. The pools are structured in a way
that the revenue is divided among the members with stress on loyalty and discouraging pool
hopping [25]
If the hash rate of the mining pool is H, then the pool will find an average of Ht / (232 D) blocks
[27]. The average reward earned by the pool is HtB / (232 D) where B=bitcoins. If a miner with
hash rate h=pH (where p is the fraction of pool's total power contributed by the miner), he will
receive a qHtB / (232D) reward.
The pool is maintained by an operator who charges f percentage of the block reward [27].
Therefore, the operator for each block received fR where R is the reward and the rest (1-f) R is
distributed between the pool members.
One of the core components of Bitcoin is the communication network. It is a decentralized ad
hoc peer-to-peer network. The consensus protocol depends on the performance and stability of
the network because latency in finding a block might increase the possibility of a temporary fork,
and an attacker will benefit from this fact and might be able to control a substantial portion of the
network by winning the fork and there by getting more reward. Thus Bitcoin has to have a
decentralized network with low latency.
The network topology of Bitcoin is such that any node can join the network, and each node has
eight outgoing connections and can handle up to 125 incoming connections [18]. Note that
mobile clients do not handle incoming connections. Peers who join the network initially have to
introduce themselves to other peers. This is similar to other peer-to-peer networks. Bitcoin
establishes this using dedicated directory servers, which consist of lists of peer addresses. Peers
send information about one another using two ways. First, when the peer joins the network, it
broadcasts messages containing its information. Second, when it receives incoming connections,
the node asks for a sample from the list of addresses [18] [26]. The transactions and blocks are
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broadcast to the entire network by flooding. Node forwards new data only once to prevent
infinite propagation [18].
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III.

Shared Wealth Cryptocurrency

The security of Bitcoin lies in its decentralized nature and its being public since all transactions
are open and stored in series of blocks (refers to Technical Aspects of Bitcoin, Section II).
Miners play a crucial role in ensuring that the Bitcoin works as explained in [19], and they are
also responsible for preventing double-spending attacks. Miners are compensated with bitcoins
for their effort, which includes creating blocks and solving cryptographic puzzles.
As the level of difficulty is adjusted based on the total mining power of the network, an
individual miner has to mine a block for years if he or she is using an ASIC [31].
To illustrate individual mining, consider four miners: Ted, Charlie, Ross, and Keith. They record
N transactions in blocks and toil to find the proof of work by solving the cryptographic puzzle.
After working on an individual block for T amount of time, Ted finds the proof of work. For ease
of understanding, we assume that the solution of proof of work should initially have four bytes as
zeroes (as shown in Fig. 5), and as an outcome Ted earns the reward. As portrayed in the
diagram, Keith and Ross nearly got the solution, but due to the Bitcoin reward structure, their
work is wasted (futile).

Fig. 5: Individual mining
People join mining pools to earn bitcoins on regular intervals instead of waiting for a year and
risking the possibility of their work going to waste [31]. The mining pool wait time is generally
predictable, and the income they earn is steady; in contrast, if they mine alone, there are higher
chances of their work ending up wasted. Hence, the miners decide to form their own mining
pools or collaborate with others [18]. The members of the mining pool work together in solving
the cryptographic puzzle. Upon completion, the reward is distributed based on the amount of
mining power (computational resources) each individual exerted.
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SharedWealth Protocol
We have come up with a protocol that provides an incentive for miners to share their partially
solved cryptographic puzzle (we dubbed it a near-miss) with other miners. The outcome reward
earned is dispersed among the miners based on their effort. Here is how our protocol would
operate:
1. Instead of giving the reward to one individual miner, the reward is divided into 80% and
20%.
2. 80% of the reward will go to the miner who finds the actual proof of work (solution to the
cryptographic puzzle) as well as an additional coin for including the near-miss solutions
of the other miners.
3. The remaining 20% of the reward is dispersed among the miners who shared the “nearmiss.”
a. The near-miss is the partial solution found by the miners. If the actual solution
starts with n bits of zeroes, solution starting with 1, 2 or 3 … n-1 bits of zeroes is
considered as near-miss. We did the tests for near-miss = 1,2,3 and 4 (refer
section IV for more details)
b. The wining miner cannot include his near-miss. If he includes his near-miss, it
will be discarded and he will be only paid for the actual solution.
c. Miners cannot send multiple near-misses.
d. If they are multiple winners of near-miss, the 20 % reward is divided among the
winners based on their near-miss. For example, if they are three near-miss
winners who send near-miss of 2, 2 and 3 then 10% of reward is given to the one
who have send the near-miss 3 and the rest 10% is divided among the two miners
who send the near-misses of 2.
4. If the winning miner does not include the near-miss of other miners. He only gets the
80% reward and the 20% reward is discarded.
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To illustrate, let us again consider four miners: Ted, Ross, Charlie, and Keith. They are working
by spending their individual resources to find the solution to the cryptographic puzzle. As Fig. 6
shows, only Ted finds the proof of work which starts with four bits of zeroes, but Keith and
Charlie send their near-miss (partial solution) to him. Therefore, per our protocol design, the
reward is dispersed as follows:
Reward structure:
Ted = 80% of Reward
Keith = (20/2) % of Reward
Ross = (20/2) % of Reward
Ted + = 2
Keith and Ross also receive some of the reward, and Ted retains 80% of the reward and an
additional two coins for including Keith and Ross’s partial solution.

Fig. 6: Illustration of SharedWealth Protocol
Let’s Examine Possible Attacks:
1. Trudy ignores the near-miss and does not include it in her solution.
Let us propose that Trudy is working alone, and due to her selfish nature, she wishes not to share
the reward. She will not include the near-miss in her solution. The solution for this problem can
be this:




Provide an incentive for Trudy to include the near-miss of other miners. As you can
see from our reward structure, Trudy will receive extra coins if she includes the nearmiss of other miners.
If Trudy still wishes not to include the near-miss, then 20% of the reward is
discarded. Consequently, Trudy receives only 80% of the reward. As a result, Trudy
is forced to include the near-miss of other miners because it will provide her
additional income on top of the regular 80%.
18

2. Trudy finds the near-miss on her own, including it in her solution but discarding the near-miss
of others.
Suppose Trudy comes up with a plan to find the near-miss on her own, and she includes it in her
solution along with her proof of work to obtain the full reward. This is the proposed solution:


Assign a unique ID to each miner. Each time the solution is broadcast, verify to see
whether the ID of the miner who sent the near-miss matches the ID of the miner who
found the actual proof of work. If it matches, then discard the 20% reward and give
only 80% of the reward to the miner.

3. Trudy only includes the near-miss of her friends while discarding the near-miss of other
miners.
Suppose Trudy has or is forced to have friends. Due to our above design, she wishes only to
include the near-miss of her friends and discard the near-miss of others. This is the proposed
solution:


As the solution is broadcast over the network, the miners who find the near-miss will
check the solution and notice if their near-miss is not included. In return, those miners
who were not compensated because of Trudy’s selfish act will not include her near-miss
in the future. This is the conventional tit-for-tat approach [32].
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Advantages of Our Proposed Solutions:
1. Selfish mining [29] and other attacks [31] are prevented when miners do not form mining
pools.
2. Overall mining cost is reduced when miners share their work.
3. New currency generated is distributed among miners depending on the amount of mining
power.
4. An individual miner does not have to wait for a year to earn a reward.
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IV. Testing
For testing our protocol, we have created two models as follows:
Winner-Take-All
This model is based on Bitcoin protocol. It follows the reward strucure as described in Section II
and Section III.
SharedWealth
This model is based on SharedWealth protocol. It follows the reward structure as described in
Section III.
Setup
The tests were were conducted on a Dell Laptop with the following configurations:
Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4500U CPU @ 1.80GHz 2.40Hz
RAM: 8.00 GB
Operating System: Windows 10 (64-bit)
Java version: 1.7.0_85
Java HotSpot(TM) 64-Bit Server VM (build 25.65-b01, mixed mode)

Simutation
The simulation was done using Sockets and Multi-Threading. Each of the thread represents the miner
and transaction. All the transaction details are send to the miner Threads. These threads are chosen
randomly to illustrate peer-to-peer connectivity. All the threads shares the same computational
resources.
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Demonstration of Reward Distribution in Winner-Take-All
We simulated Bitcoin Network with six miners (Alice, Bob, Trudy, Charlie, Dave, and Nate).
They compete against each other to create blocks and solve the proof of work. The difficulty is
increased after every six blocks.
The following tests were conducted with difficulty levels starting from 2 to 5. The idea behind
this test is to show how the wealth is unevenly distrubuted and also how the work of other miners
gets wasted. For this demonstration, we are rewarding the winner with 20 coins.
The bars refers to the total reward earned after six blocks.

Demonstration of reward distribuition in SharedWealth
We simulated the SharedWealth Network with six miners (Alice, Bob, Trudy, Charlie, Dave, and
Nate). They share their near-miss with each other and get rewarded for sharing the near-miss.
We did a test with difficulty levels starting from 2 to 5. The idea behind this test is to show how
the wealth is evenly distrubuted and how the work of other miners does not get wasted. For this
demonstration, the reward structure is based on SharedWealth protocol mentioned in Section III.
In these tests, when the difficulty is n, some of the miners find proof of work for n-1, which is
the near-miss, and share it with other miners.
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Comparision of Reward Distribution
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Figure 7: Reward distribution when difficulty is 2
Miner
Alice
Bob
Trudy
Charlie
Dave
Nate

Miner
Alice
Bob
Trudy
Charlie
Dave
Nate

Rewards Earned in Winner-Take-All
40 (Block 1 and Block 2 winner)
0
0
20
40 (Block 3 and Block 5 winner)
20

Rewards Earned in SharedWealth
2 + 2 + 16 + 1 (Block 1, Block 3 near-miss winner, and Block 5 winner)
2 + 2 + 2 + 16 + 2 (Block 1, Block 2, Block 4 near-miss winner, and
Block 6 winner)
2 + 16 + 2 (Block 1 near-miss winner and Block 4 winner)
16 + 2 + 2 (Block 3 winner and Block 4 near-miss winner)
16 + 2 +16 + 2 + 2 (Block 1, Block 2 winner, and Block 6 near-miss
winner)
2 + 4 + 2 (Block 1, Block 5, and Block 6 near-miss winner)

Total
21
24
20
20
38
8

From the above graph/data, we can see that in Winner-Take-All, though other miners put their
resources towards solving the cryptographic puzzle, their work was futile because they did not
get any reward.
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Comparision of Reward Distribution
70

Total Rewards Earned

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Alice

Bob

Trudy

Charlie

Dave

Nate

Miner
Winner-Take-All

SharedWealth

Figure 8: Reward distribution when difficulty is 3

Miner
Alice
Bob
Trudy
Charlie
Dave
Nate

Miner

Rewards Earned in Winner-Take-All

Alice

20

Bob

0

Trudy

20

Charlie

60 (Block 1, Block 3, and Block 6 winner)

Dave

0

Nate

20

Rewards Earned in SharedWealth
2 + 2 + 16 + 2 + 2(Block 1, Block 2, Block 5 near-miss winner, and
Block 4 winner)
16 + 2 + 2 + 2 (Block 3 winner, Block 4, and Block 6 near-miss winner)
2 + 16 + 2 +2 (Block 1, Block 6 near-miss winner, and Block 2 winner)
2 + 2 +16 + 2 (Block 2, Block 4 near-miss winner, and Block 6 winner)
2 + 16 + 2 (Block 3 near-miss winner and Block 5 winner)
16 + 2 +2 +2 (Block 1 winner, Block 3, and Block 5 near-miss winner)
24

Total
24
22
22
22
30
22
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Figure 9: Reward distribution when difficulty is 4

Miner
Alice
Bob
Trudy
Charlie
Dave
Nate

Miner

Rewards Earned in Winner-Take-All

Alice

0

Bob

0

Trudy

0

Charlie

60 (Block 2, Block 4 and Block 5 winner)

Dave

60 (Block 1,Block 3 and Block 6 winner)

Nate

0

Rewards Earned in SharedWealth
16 +2 + 2 (Block 2 winner and Block 3 near-miss winner)
2 + 16 + 2 + 2 (Block 3 winner, Block 1, and Block 5 near-miss winner)
2 + 2 + 16 + 2 (Block 2, Block 3, Block 6 near-miss winner, and Block 4
winner)
2 + 2 + 2 (Block 2, Block 5, and Block 6 near-miss winner)
2 + 16 + 2 +16 + 2 (Block 1 near-miss winner, Block 5, and Block 6
winner)
16 + 2 (Block 1 winner)

25

Total
20
22
22
6
38
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Comparision of Reward Distribution
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Figure 10: Reward distribution when difficulty is 5

Miner
Alice
Bob
Trudy
Charlie
Dave
Nate

Miner

Rewards Earned

Alice

20

Bob

20

Trudy

20

Charlie

20

Dave

0

Nate

40 (Block 3 and Block 6 Winner)

Rewards Earned
2 + 16 + 2 + 4 (Block 1, Block 5 near-miss winner, and Block 4 winner)
16 + 2 +2 (Block 1 winner and Block 4 near-miss winner)
2 + 2 + 16 + 2 (Block 1, Block 2 near-miss winner, and Block 6 nearmiss winner)
16 + 2 + 2 ( Block 3 winner and Block 6 near-miss winner)
16 + 2 +2 (Block 2 winner and Block 3 near-miss winner)
2 + 2 + 2 + 16 + 1 + 2 (Block 2, Block 3, Block 4, Block 6 near-miss
winner, and Block 5 winner)
26

Total
24
20
22
20
20
25

Demonstration of Reward Distribution when number of miners are 500 and 1000
We conducted another test to show reward distribution in winner-take-all and SharedWealth
when blocks discovered are 40, 50 and 100. The number of miners are 500 and 1000. The
following are the results

Number of Miners

Blocks Discovered

Winner-Take-All*

500

40

36 (7.19%)

SharedWealth*
(near-miss:2)
81 (16.2%)

500

50

44 (8.79%)

147 (29.4%)

1000

100

59 (11.79%)

237 (47.4%)

* Count of Miners who receive some reward
From the above results we see that the number of miners who receive some reward in SharedWealth
model is more than the Winner-Take-All model.
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V.

Conclusion

We studied the Bitcoin protocol and how miners join or form mining pools to earn steady
rewards. We explored the possible attacks associated with mining pools [29].
To prevent such attacks, we created a distinct peer-to-peer protocol called the SharedWealth
protocol, which ensures that each reward is evenly distributed among miners. With our
demonstration, we showed how the reward is evenly distributed.
In the future, we want to add some restriction on miners so that they cannot earn more coins than
the total reward. For example, right now we are giving miners an additional coin for each nearmiss they include in their solutions. The possible vulnerability here is that miners can add 100
near-misses, and this will result in them earning 100 coins, which is more than the total reward.
We also want the difficulty level adjusted based on the average number of near-misses the
miners find for a given time t.
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